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Abstract 
Good governance is recognized as a fundamental indicator of the success of 
a company. For a small- midsized company, this is particularly so, as such 
companies must be able to competitively demonstrate their flexibility in the 
face of market forces. This flexibility is the primary advantage they hold 
over larger firms (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). 
 
Such companies, however, can find it difficult to attract good directors 
(Daum and Neff, 2003) and this makes developing improved strategies of 
governance a challenge. Taylor, Chait and Holland suggest top directors are 
not attracted to small/ medium companies because “the stakes remain low, 
the meetings process-driven, the outcomes ambiguous, and the deliberations 
insular” (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). We suggest that the attraction of 
quality directors is a uniquely impacting situation for small and mid-size 
firms, as it is there where additional management resources should be 
needed most urgently. 
 
Directors on the boards of small-medium sized businesses are often lagging 
behind directors of large companies in that they are less likely to be 
independent external directors and are less likely to represent a diversity of 
attributes (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). Arthur Levitt, 
former United States Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, describes 
the culture of medium sized business directorships as a “kind of a fraternity 
of CEOs who serve on one another's boards” (Stainburn, 2005). In addition, 
evidence suggests directors of small- medium businesses are often 
insufficiently trained for the role.  Uncertain directors may, for example, be 
unwilling to ask crucial questions of managers before making major 
decisions. “Board members sometimes are made to feel that asking a thorny 
question or advancing an alternative opinion is disloyal to the 
administration” (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). 
 
Small and medium businesses, however, are a growing contributor to the 
national economies of countries internationally. In New Zealand, small and 
medium-size firms recording large GDP values, ahead of many large 
businesses, which makes our investigation into good governance practices of 
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SMEs relevant to suggest areas in which these firms can improve their 
governance policies and practices. 
 
We have reviewed more than 2,000 directors, executives and investors in 
New Zealand, making this one of the largest non-government surveys in 
governance. Supported by 16 large corporate organizations, such as KPMG, 
Business New Zealand, Simpson Grierson, Brook Asset Management, Porter 
Novelli,  Sheffield and ‘Management’ Magazine, this work suggests that the 
current processes through which directors are selected and  trained to serve 
on Boards of small and medium businesses needs to be altered. We are also 
concerned over the lack of director education and the close involvement of 
the Chief Executives as members of the Boards. There is a general concern 
over the lack of director independence and whether directors are effective in 
their roles. 
 
We are recommending an alternative process for SMEs to select directors, 
which will hopefully expand the available pool of directors in quantity and 
quality. 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the drivers of the economy in 
many countries, yet fall behind larger companies in the area of corporate 
governance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998).  We believe that 
the focus on governance processes and policies has been incorrectly placed 
on the relatively few large globally active firms where extensive governance 
regimes are established and monitored, overlooking the large group of GDP-
driving small and mid-size firms in each country. Likely, this top-down 
approach has tainted the discussion and created an environment where 
governance is largely an audit and compliance tool, rather than an accepted 
component of long-term strategy for any sustainable business and warmly 
embraced by owners, operators and directors. 
 
The failing of large corporations in recent years (such as Enron) has brought 
the issue of corporate governance into prominence and boards are being 
asked to improve their performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Due to the 
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lack of financial and organizational resources, this call to arms for business 
operators of any size represents a new challenge, and we are wondering how 
executives, directors and investors will approach this opportunity to improve 
the leadership resources of their firms. 
The boards of smaller companies are far less likely to comprise independent 
outside directors (Daum and Neff, 2003; Stainburn, 2005). SMEs can find 
attracting quality directors difficult, research suggests, because such 
directors tend to be repelled by the insularity of meeting procedures and the 
“low stakes” involved (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). Whether it is the 
glamour of large corporations with the large compensation packages and the 
news headlines, or the ability to influence operating results on a large scale, 
smaller firms seem to have to work harder to attract quality directors. We 
have asked directors for the reasons of joining a smaller firm, and it is clear 
that remuneration and glitz are not very high motivators for directors in New 
Zealand (Mueller, Dana, Taylor and Maier, 2006). 
 
As you would imagine in smaller firms, people work closer together and in 
many cases the leadership also performs management tasks – and vice versa. 
In many firms the CEO is also a board member. In a smaller but still 
significant number of firms, the CEO is also the Chairperson of the board. 
This raises some obvious issues of independence and conflicts. How many 
CEOs, working closely with staff every day, can make tough staff layoff 
decisions without thinking about colleagues and friends? To what extent 
does a CEO vote for his own pay check and stature associated with the 
position, rather than for the shareholder interest (as a director would be 
obligated to do…). Notwithstanding the fact that many CEOs in smaller 
firms will also be shareholders and thus be expected to be aligned in their 
personal interests with those of their shareholders, we are mindful that a 
certain degree of schizophrenia is expected from CEOs who are expected to 
disassociate themselves from their day-to-day managerial duties when they 
enter the board room. Is this overlap of obligations helpful, or should board 
members all be independent, drawing on the CEOs expertise as a 
‘consultant’ to the board, rather then being a full voting director? 
 
Most research indicates that Boards function best when the CEO is not also 
the Chair of the board (Standard and Poor, 2004; Damodoran, 2004; Petra, 
2005; Whitehead Mann Group, 2005). “Many CEOs don’t have the skills to 
be Chairman and certainly not in their own organisation, because they can’t 
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let go” (Whitehead Mann Group, 2005). Inexperienced directors can feel 
unconfident about talking thorny issues for fear of appearing disloyal 
(Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). SME Boards tend to lack the diversity of 
skills and attributes to “enable companies to evaluate key strategic issues 
more fully and monitor their performance more effectively” (Henderson 
Global Investors, 2003). The training and induction of new directors is also a 
cause for concern among SME boards. Boards also need to be prepared to 
submit heir own performance, both as a whole and as individual directors, to 
self-analysis on a regular basis (Colin, 1994; Wilkes, 2004; Behan, 2004; 
Petra, 2005). The CEO of a smaller business may find it very difficult to step 
back enough to allow the Board to effectively function, and potential 
conflicts of interest can arise when the CEO is also the Chairperson of the 
Board (Petra, 2005). A CEO’s inability to let go makes them unsuitable 
candidates for chairship of their Boards as they do not always have the skills 
they need to overcome this and successfully guide the Board. (Whitehead 
Mann Group, 2005). The Chairperson should be able to run the Board rather 
than the organisation, have a positive working relationship with the CEO, 
and a clear separation of responsibilities (Whitehead Mann Group, 2005). 
 
Methodology 
 
With the help of an MBA team from the Waikato Management Schol, 
consisting of six international managers in the final months of their MBA 
program, we have developed an online survey (www.worldsurvey.info) with 
questions based on more than 100 of the most recent governance studies and 
academic reports in this area. To reach a widespread level of feedback, we 
developed questions suitable for company executives, corporate directors 
and investors and packaged all of those into one survey, mitigating 
confusion through clear separation of the three segments and instructions. 
The survey questions were reviewed and edited by leaders and executive 
staff of some of the most prominent firms, government departments and 
industry organizations in New Zealand, such as KPMG, Simpson Grierson, 
Business New Zealand, Brook Asset Management, Sheffield, Bank of New 
Zealand, Porter Novelli, NZ Venture Capital Assn, Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit, Business New Zealand, New Zealand 
Shareholders Association, New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
New Zealand Institute of Management, several Chambers of Commerce and 
Management Magazine. This group represents one of the largest collectives 
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of leaders and corporations ever in New Zealand to investigate the status of 
governance. In addition to editing and editorial guidance, all of these 
supporters distributed an e-mail with the link to the survey to their respective 
client mailing lists. We have reviewed more than 2,000 responses to this 
ongoing survey to date, from directors, executives and investors. 
 
The survey results were received anonymously, with some of the 
respondents completing all sections of the survey (executives, directors, 
investors), and others only completing the parts which applied to them. The 
survey has sensitive branching sections which only showed pages with 
questions applicable to the specific respondent. 
 
The survey was also described on a daily morning business show on the 
largest TV station in the country and had long write-ups in national business 
magazines (Management Magazine and Director Magazine), business 
sections of daily news papers and industry magazines, further encouraging 
participation and creating a compelling call to participate. 
 
We conclude that this is a representative sample of New Zealand business, 
without material bias as to geographic location, industry, size or other key 
demographics. 
 
 
Results 
 
We take notice of the fact that nearly 39% of respondents were women, as 
that indicates a reasonable participation of women, who are underpresented 
as leaders of business organizations in New Zealand but seem to be better 
represented as members of a management team and as investors. 
 
With 75% of the respondents requesting a copy of the summary report and 
63% of the respondents volunteering to make additional 1-on-1 time 
available on the telephone to discuss their thoughts about governance, this 
topic clearly is of more than just passing interest. We believe this high level 
of interest in the topic, beyond the simple completion of a survey, indicates 
the importance of this discussion, and since 72% of the respondents were 
from small and mid-size firms, this issue has certainly now penetrated the 
business community beyond the large, publicly listed firms. 
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Possibly as a reflection of the large number of small and mid-size firms in 
this sample comes the report that 50% of the firms have no independent 
directors. Nam and Nam point out that a Board will function best where 
there is a good spread of inside/executive and outside/independent directors 
in order to provide objective judgments of managerial performance (Nam 
and Nam, 2004), and it is by now well documented that independent 
directors are favoured by investors and regulatory agencies worldwide. 
Independent directors can likely not be recruited with traditional means. As 
a CEO or as a board director, the tendency in recruiting a new director is 
often to focus on individuals where there is an existing personal relationship 
or on the stature of the candidate (Conger and Lawler, 2001), and this 
inward-looking approach likely excludes competent independent directors. 
Arthur Levitt, former United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chair, describes the culture of medium sized business directorships as a 
“kind of a fraternity of CEOs who serve on one another's boards” 
(Stainburn, 2005), something that may enable less effective monitoring 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).   
A search process that is rigorous and takes in a wider range of possible 
candidates can offer SMEs access to directors with greater diversity in 
“background, experience, age, gender, ethnicity and nationality” (London 
Business School, 2003). Nominating committees comprising such 
independent NEDs are more likely to nominate NDEs to the Board who will 
challenge the decisions of the CEO (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1998), and we 
can confirm that investors are interested in directors who can vigorously 
debate issues at board level.  
The call for more independent directors seems to have been heard loud and 
clear by the business community in New Zealand. In this study alone, 
respondents have indicated a need for more than 2,200 independent directors 
over the next five years, placing the total number of directors needed in New 
Zealand at much more than 10,000. This raises the issue how those directors 
are recruited, and where executives and their investors can find qualified 
directors to take on this important role. 
 
For SME Boards, there may soon be no choice but to introduce 
improvements to the standard of governance. The pressure on Boards to 
improve their corporate performance and the ways in which they oversee the 
company’s management has led to what Nicholson and Kiel describe as “a 
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series of inquiries and reports” advocating corporate governance reform 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
 
For a SME, the task of selecting independent directors becomes crucial to 
the credibility of the company, and we will propose alternate ways for SMEs 
to identify suitable new directors.  
 
What makes these high quality directors join a Board? 
Taylor, Chait and Holland suggest top directors are not attracted to small/ 
medium companies because “the stakes remain low, the meetings process-
driven, the outcomes ambiguous, and the deliberations insular” (Taylor, 
Chait and Holland, 2001), and this raises concerns over how expectations of 
directors can be met by firms. 
We now know from our work that it is not the money or the prestige 
associated with serving as a director of a publicly listed firm. Potential 
directors want to ‘do some good’, and presumably want to be able to use 
their talents to help shape the firm towards achieving better performance. 
They also are very concerned about the level of personal risk attached to 
their directorship position. The backdrop for this level of importance could 
be the more stringent personal liability risks for directors in New Zealand 
than in many other industrialized countries, and we speculate that firms with 
an interest in new independent director will need to demonstrate stable 
financial performance with a high degree of transparency and accountability 
– and access to director liability insurance. 
 
Of greater concern to us is the reflection of 66% of our respondents that the 
reputation of the fellow directors is ‘very important’ to them (Graph 1). This 
raises the issue of how firms create diverse boards, bringing in new 
independent directors, if these new candidates use the existing make-up of 
the board as one of their key determinants for participation. Clearly, 
investors, executives and directors must begin to craft a board which is not 
only effective internally, but also signals to the pool of prospective directors 
outside an attractive environment created through reputable directors. 
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Graph 1: If you were offered a Board position now, how important would 
each of the following factors be for you? 
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Where can we find these thousands of newly needed directors? 
It has been advocated that a board of directors is the best bargain in modern 
business because it represents a cadre of expert consultants to management, 
with a level of talent and experience the company could never hire on a per 
diem basis (Charles and Caroline, 2003), and many small business owners 
will agree that consultants can be horrendously expensive and may not easily 
be available to smaller and less visible firms. If directors might now be 
available with a motivation other than of pure income, business leaders and 
investors might be able to re-position their needs and objectives to merge 
their long-term interests of achievement with those of prospective directors. 
The process of assembling the right mix requires a disciplined approach 
involving a careful assessment of the needs and challenges of the company 
(Charles and Caroline, 2003; London Business School, 2003) and this 
includes demonstrating to stakeholders that the company is committed to a 
rigorous selection process (London Business School, 2003).  “Sharing 
information with shareholders, employees and other customers 
demonstrating that a company is committed to such a selection process is 
likely to foster greater trust in its NED appointments” (London Business 
School, 2003). We know from our work that the current selection process is 
primarily centered around recruiting friends and colleagues, rather than 
opening the funnel wide for the exposure to new categories and talents of 
directors. 
Diversity and independence of the company are agreed key considerations in 
appointing a good mix of directors (Henderson Global Investors, 2003; 
Petra, 2005; London Business School, 2003; Nam and Nam, 2004), but there 
is less accord over what qualities the individual director should have. For 
some researchers, the ideal candidate will be a proven leader who has 
already addressed the kinds of issues the company is facing and will have 
financial acumen (Charles and Caroline, 2003; Petra 2005) while others 
say/believe a diversity of candidates, including those without a business 
background, bring with them different perspectives to apply to business 
problems and “enable companies to evaluate key strategic issues more fully 
and monitor their performance more effectively” (Henderson Global 
Investors, 2003; Taylor, Chait and Holland, 1996). Petra notes the 
recommendation that that the mix of talents and skills required be set down 
in writing in advance of appointing directors and include “business, finance, 
accounting, marketing, public policy, manufacturing and operations, 
government, technology, and other areas the board deems desirable” (Petra, 
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2005). Nicholson and Kiel point out that corporate governance will rarely be 
a function of one component (such as social capital or human capital) and 
the challenge for a Board arises from its understanding of the roles required 
and its ability to match the intellectual capital of the board to those roles 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
We are concerned that in our population of directors in New Zealand, a large 
number of those directors (60%) learned of directorship openings through 
other directors (Graph 2), or were large shareholders themselves (32%) or 
one of the founders (34%). Although the debate over the suitability of 
founders and shareholders to also be effective directors is far from over, it is 
clearly restrictive that the vast majority of directorship positions are 
‘marketed’ through the existing directors. This may very well tap into the 
diverse and rich network of professional friends and colleagues who 
otherwise might not respond to invitations from strangers, but it begs the 
question whether the recruitment of new directors through existing directors 
gives the firm access to the talent set it needs. 
 
Early indications from our continuing work are that there is a large 
differential of competence between directors on the same board, and we 
wonder if the new directors are recruited more for their compatibility with 
existing directors than for their demonstrated competence. In the best case, 
this recruitment process yields directors of good compentence and similar 
reputation. In the worst case, this process restricts the addition of directors 
which might not ‘fit’ for other than competence reasons. 
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Graph 2: How did you hear about openings for directorships? 
 
 
Assembling the right mix of directors is the key to ensuring good 
governance (Charles and Caroline, 2003; Conger and Lawler, 2001; London 
Business School, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Knowing the appropriate 
mix of directors is not necessarily a matter of best practice, but depends on 
the needs of the particular Board (Felton and Watson, 2002; Nichols and 
Kiel, 2004). Felton and Watson describe the process as not a “ ‘checklist’ of 
the ten best practices” but a “state of mind – a considered balance between 
the need for the board to represent shareholder interests and the need to 
ensure management feels sufficiently free to focus on value creation” 
(Felton and Watson, 2002). In our sample, industry experience and a 
professional legal background scored low with investors. Investors want 
individuals as representatives with proven, preferably international, business 
accomplishments, which experience from outside the industry and diversity 
to the board table. Directors who sit on many boards are less likely to win 
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investor votes than those who bring a fresh perspective to the party, focused 
more on long-term strategic planning than on compliance policing. 
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Summary 
"In the final analysis, it is our view that the best boards comprise high 
quality, committed, independent directors; every board has room for more of 
these types of directors" (Felton and Watson, 2002).  
 
Our work has shown that thousands of new directors are needed in New 
Zealand over the next five years, and investors are predominantly looking 
for independent directors with a proven track record outside the industry, 
creating a diverse board. Directors are also considering the reputations of the 
existing board and their own personal level of risk, before they commit to a 
directorship where they largely wish to ‘do some good’. 
 
We are left with the conclusion that the selection process for directors in 
New Zealand is inadequate to supply these thousands of independent 
directors, many of which would likely not have served as directors before 
and might be well-performing executives in other firms. There is a need for 
a ‘market’ where prospective directors and firms’ investors and boards can 
‘meet’, to connect and recruit. We propose that the Directions work in 
several countries can establish criteria which may guide investors and 
executives in  their search for directors, and that we can establish a globally 
valid benchmark score which can easily compare governance 
accomplishments across borders. 
 
 
 
Note to readers: We are looking for interested academics and institutions 
who wish to be the research leaders for this work in their countries. Please 
contact the author at m@usainfo.net for more details. 
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